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This paper examines two striking examples of societies that faced collapse due to acute 
scarcity of resources yet successfully countered the problem and survived: the response 
to forest depletion in pre-industrial Japan during the Tokugawa period (1600-1868); and 
the introduction of rationing and price controls in Britain and the United States during 
World War II. After discussing the contexts in which scarcity arose, the processes 
through which the problem was tackled, and the reasons for the success of the response 
(and its limitations), the paper draws conclusions about the lessons these case studies 
provide for confronting the crisis of climate change. The historical examples give some 
reasons for hope. They show that successful and radical reform is possible, that 
government regulation is an effective means of response, that local action makes a 
difference, and that tackling scarcity can be a means of promoting social equality. 
Unfortunately, the cases also give strong reasons for pessimism. They demonstrate: the 
importance of political resolve and long-term vision, which today’s politicians generally 
lack; that people and governments will take action when there is genuine fear in society, 
yet fear of climate change is absent in most countries today; that market solutions must 
be approached with caution, yet we seem to be placing considerable hope in them for 
solving the climate crisis; and that societies must be weaned off consumerism, yet 
modern consumer culture appears so deeply ingrained as to be unassailable. Overall, the 
historical case studies allow us to step back and look at the big picture of climate change 
with a clarity that the intricacies of contemporary policy debates do not allow. Krznaric   3
INTRODUCTION 
 
Climate change is often described as a global challenge without historical precedent. 
Never before has there been a problem that is so potentially destructive to humanity, so 
irreversible or so borderless. The temptation, therefore, is to look to the present or 
future for solutions (such as new technologies) rather than to look to the past. How 
could one draw lessons from the past if there are no comparable crises, if climate change 
is unique? 
 
However, if we think about climate change not as a scientific or ecological problem, but 
as one of responding to acute resource scarcity that requires massive social adjustment, 
then history becomes relevant. This is because human societies have, at various points, 
faced collapse or breakdown due to a scarcity of resources, yet managed to adjust and 
avoid destruction or impoverishment. Two of the most striking examples are the 
response to forest depletion in pre-industrial Japan during the Tokugawa period (1600-
1868), and the introduction of rationing and price controls in Britain and the United 
States during World War II.  
 
Both these instances of social change are well known and have been subject to 
comprehensive scholarship. What has not been done is to analyse in depth how they can 
illuminate the struggle to tackle climate change, which has at its centre a problem of 
scarcity: only a limited amount of carbon dioxide (and other greenhouse gases) can be 
safely emitted into the atmosphere. Current emission levels need to be drastically reduced 
and new ways of allocating the right to emit carbon dioxide urgently need to be drawn 
up. Of course, carbon dioxide is not scarce in the same way that food is scarce during a 
famine, since there continues to be large amounts of fossil fuels available for producing 
it. The point is that reducing carbon dioxide emissions requires treating it as if it were 
scarce:  
 
The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to present two detailed case studies of responses 
to acute resource scarcity and then to highlight the lessons they provide for confronting 
the climate crisis. My hope is that an historical perspective will help us to step back and 
look at the big picture of global warming, and to temporarily escape from being ensnared 
and sidetracked by the intricacies of contemporary policy debates. 
 
For each case study I will examine: 
•  The context in which scarcity arose 
•  The processes and policies through which the problem was tackled 
•  The degree of success of the response 
•  The underlying reasons for the success of the response, and where appropriate 
the explanations for failures 
 
As you read the case studies, the parallels with the current crisis of climate change will 
become apparent. I will leave discussing the lessons we can draw until the conclusion of 
the paper. Krznaric   4
RATIONING AND PRICE CONTROLS IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED 
STATES DURING WORLD WAR II 
 
Imagine a government today in a wealthy country suddenly announcing that within a few 
months – or even from tomorrow onwards – consumers would be permitted to purchase 
no more than a few ounces of cheese, tea, sugar, tinned beans and meat each week. 
Imagine also that there were no new cars for sale and that people were granted only 
enough petrol to travel 150 miles per month. Imagine that bread could not be sold above 
a set price, and that retailers only received supplies in accordance with the number of 
customers registered with them. 
 
All this seems unthinkable today in our era of consumer choice and free markets. Yet 
this is precisely what happened in the 1940s in two of the world’s great powerhouses of 
industrial capitalism, Britain and the United States. Due to wartime shortages and 
inflationary pressures, rationing and price controls became the primary method of 
allocating scarce consumer goods. The most fundamental element of a capitalist 
economy – prices freely determined by the market – was largely suspended.
1 
 
Today we can hardly imagine people accepting and adjusting to such a lifestyle upheaval, 
yet they did. Today we expect policy to be phased in gradually, yet this happened virtually 
overnight. Today we would anticipate such a system to fail, yet for the most part it was 
highly successful. So how was the system of rationing and price controls introduced? 
How did it function? What factors contributed to its successes, and to its limitations? 
 




Rationing of basic foodstuffs and household goods began in January 1940, only months 
after war with Germany broke out, and was soon extended to include other items such as 
clothing, soap and petrol. It continued into the post-war period and did not end until the 
early 1950s. During these years of austerity there was an exceptional degree of state 
involvement in the economy, and an unprecedented regulation of, and reduction in, 
consumption. Consumption as a share of net national expenditure fell from 87% in 1938 
to 55% in 1943, whereas military expenditure rose from 7% to 55% over the same 
period.
2 Food in particular was highly managed: by 1942 rationed and price-controlled 
foods constituted over 50% of total food expenditure.
3 
 
What were the main reasons for introducing rationing? First, to redirect resources to the 
war effort (e.g. food for troops, raw materials for producing war machinery, freeing-up 
shipping space). Second, to prevent food and other consumer-good shortages on the 
‘home front’ (i.e. in Britain) and the related problems of queuing, hoarding and spiralling 
prices. Third, to ensure that ‘fair shares’ of goods were received by all citizens. Food was 
seen to be an especially problematic area because of the country’s position as a net food 
importer. When the war began, Britain was importing 50% of its meat, 70% of cheese 
and sugar, 80% of fruit and 90% of cereals and fats.
4 
 
How did the system develop? 
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Pre-war planning 
The British government was already prepared for rationing when the war broke out. In 
1936 – two years before Prime Minister Chamberlain declared ‘peace in our time’ – it 
established an influential subcommittee to plan for wartime rationing, chaired by Sir 
William Beveridge (who had been permanent secretary to the Ministry of Food during 
World War I and was to be influential in the development of the post-war welfare state). 
The subcommittee concluded that war would require comprehensive control of supply 
and distribution of goods such as cereals, meat, sugar, fat and tea, and that ‘every 
member of the public would be able to maintain a fair share of the national food supply 
at a reasonable price’.
5 The country was divided into 19 administrative units and 1400 
local food committees were established in local authorities. A Food (Defence Plans) 
Department was set up. A further indication of this administrative and political foresight 




When war broke out each person over the age of six was issued with their own ration 
book. The first goods to be rationed were sugar, butter, ham and bacon (in January 
1940), followed by tea, margarine and cooking fats (in July 1940), and preserves and 
cheese (in 1941). There were three main principles of this ‘straight’ rationing system. 
First, there was an individual flat-rate ration (although a few special groups received extra 
rations, such as pregnant women and children). Second, each consumer had to register 
with a retailer, who would receive supplies based on the number of registrations. Third, 
ration allocations were not tradable: although it became legal to give a ration as a gift to 
someone, it was illegal to engage in the barter or trade of rationed foods.
6 The prices of 




The next stage of rationing began in 1941 with the introduction of a parallel ‘points’ 
rationing system for foodstuffs such as canned and processed foods, dried fruits, rice and 
biscuits. Consumers were allocated a number of points, and all foods were given a points 
price (which the government periodically adjusted). Unlike the straight rationing system, 
people could choose which goods to spend their points on, and also choose between 
retailers, but there was no guarantee their chosen goods would be available. The 
remarkable aspect of this development was not that the points system was copied from 
the Germans but that rationing was extended in response to public demand. The 
continued lavish eating of the rich was exacerbating class tension and there was 
widespread dissatisfaction with wealthy consumers being able to buy up unrationed 
goods which were expensive and in short supply. Combined with the growing food 
shortages during the winter of 1940-41, this ‘led to public discontent with the unequal 




The final stage of rationing was its operation after the war, when rationing became even 
more extensive. When the war ended in 1945, the combined straight and points rationing 
systems were maintained by the new Labour government of Clement Atlee. Bread 
rationing was introduced for the first time for two years after July 1946 and there was a 
potato control scheme operating in the winter of 1947/8. After this time rationing was 
gradually dismantled. In 1950 milk and soap were decontrolled and the points rationing 
system was also discontinued. The new Conservative government in 1951 ended Krznaric   6
rationing for tea, sugar and sweets. All other rationing and most price controls ceased 
between 1952 and 1954. 
  
How successful was the system? 
 
There is general agreement amongst scholars that rationing in wartime Britain was highly 
successful despite the existence of some black markets. First, severe food shortages of 
basic goods, extensive queuing and hoarding were largely avoided. Second, public 
opinion polls showed the system to be not only accepted by consumers but also popular, 
evident in the demand for the extension of rationing in 1941. A third and highly 
significant aspect of the system’s success was that rationing and other food control 
policies contributed to reducing social inequalities and had a positive effect on nutrition 
levels of the poorest social sectors, who for the first time had a guaranteed source of 
basic foodstuffs. The acute inequality in food intake between rich and poor, which had 
been a continuous theme in British history up until the 1930s, was largely brought to an 
end. As one analyst points out: ‘The Second World War represented a major turning-
point in the history of the British diet. The rise in consumption of brown bread, milk, 
and vegetables, coupled with food fortification resulted in a healthier diet and no social 
group fell short of its basic nutritional requirements. Middle-class food consumption 
standards undoubtedly deteriorated while the poor sections of the working class were the 
main beneficiaries of the policy.’
8 
 
There were also problems with Britain’s rationing system. First, wealthy individuals were 
still able to buy highly priced unrationed goods, such as pheasant and champagne. 
Second, black markets developed (although they were not as extensive as in the United 
States). Problems included the sale of rationed foods without coupons, sale above the 
maximum price, the manufacture and supply of controlled goods and the illegal slaughter 
of animals. The Ministry of Food’s successful prosecutions against emergency legislation 




The most problematic black market emerged with petrol. Private motorists (around one 
in ten households ran a car at the beginning of the war) were initially given a basic ration, 
amounting to around 1,800 miles per annum. This basic ration was abolished in 1942 and 
was not restored until 1945, resulting in many private vehicles being taken off the road. 
The black market arose mainly due to the over-issue of petrol coupons for commercial 
use. Haulage and other commercial vehicles often did not use their full ration and the 
excess coupons were frequently sold (illegally) to garages or private motorists. Moreover, 
the system of petrol rationing was poorly enforced.
10 
 
Although coal was in short supply throughout the war (partly because miners were called 
up to fight), Conservative Party opposition prevented it from being rationed. Instead the 
government ran a mass campaign to encourage the public to ration coal on a voluntary 
basis. People were asked to replace coal with logs, to eat food cold instead of hot, to lag 
their hot water systems, and not to have baths more than five inches deep. Families were 
encouraged to work out their ‘fuel target’ (the maximum amount of fuel they should use), 
and central heating was cut in government offices. Neighbours and friends went to each 
others’ homes carrying a lump of coal as a contribution to a shared fire. By 1944 coal 
consumption had dropped to three-quarters of its pre-war level.
11 
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Why was it successful? 
 
Despite some limitations, it is clear that rationing and price control system in Britain was 
a major success, particularly during the war. The main explanations include the following: 
 
Early preparation 
Britain was extremely well-prepared for wartime scarcity. The Ministry of Food was 
established within days of the outbreak of war, and ration books were ready for 
distribution. Although the system did not always work smoothly, and adjustments had to 
be made (such as the introduction of points rationing), the government could not be 
accused of doing ‘too little too late’. 
 
System integration and regimentation 
Rationing worked because of the high degree of integration of the system. The Ministry 
of Food controlled the whole chain of supply of rationed goods, far more extensively 
and effectively than in the United States, from raw materials to final output and sales. 
They also had the resources and staff to make the system function.
12 The existence of 
these administrative measures must be understood within the context of wartime political 
organisation: it was possible to impose such a system because the wartime national unity 
government acted effectively as a dictatorship and was not plagued by extensive party 
political dissent. This context permitted the government to impose a non-voluntary 
rationing system (except on a few items such as coal). 
 
Fear of shortages 
There was a genuine fear of shortages of basic consumer goods. Rationing was accepted 
by politicians, industry and the public as the best way of ensuring that everyone had 
sufficient food, clothing and other items, that prices did not rise out of control, and that 
food queues were avoided as far as possible. 
 
Idea of ‘fair shares’  
There was a widespread public belief that the wealthy should not be able to ‘buy their 
way out’ of rationing and that everybody should receive a fair share of the available 
goods. The idea of ‘fair shares’ – one of the staple phrases of wartime propaganda – was 
a conception of justice entailing equality of sacrifice and the guarantee of a basic 
minimum. For some of the poorest British citizens, wartime austerity was little different 
from their usual austerity, and was popular because it resulted in them being better off. 
Of course, while the wealthy were given the same ration allocations as the poor, ‘fair 




Belief in sacrifice 
There was general public acceptance that rationing was a major contribution towards the 
collective war effort. People believed that the threat from Germany was real and required 
sacrifice. Wartime propaganda contributed to the belief that action on the ‘home front’ 
was as important as action on the military front. Although some scholars contend that 
the ‘Dunkirk spirit’ should not be overemphasised in explanations for the success of 
rationing, it is clear that grass roots support for the system was extensive.
14 Moreover, 
rationing and price controls were not a sacrifice ‘in isolation’. They were just one of the 
many aspects of wartime exceptionalism and state control of people’s lives (other 
examples being conscription and factory work for women). 
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Dig for Victory 
The government’s ‘Dig for Victory’ campaign, which encouraged people to grow 
vegetables in their household gardens and on allotments, had a major impact on wartime 
food production and helped offset the food scarcity resulting from the war and rationing. 
A Cultivation of Lands (Allotments) Order in 1939 empowered councils to take over 
unoccupied lands. Dig for Victory was spectacularly successful: by 1944 around 10% of 
all food production in Britain came from allotments and private gardens, and by the end 
of the war there were around 1.5 million allotments compared to 610,000 in 1935. Seed 
swapping, sharing produce and other cooperation in home food production also had a 
significant positive effect on wartime morale and community-building. There were, in 
addition, over 6,900 ‘pig clubs’ with hundreds of thousands of members.
15 At the same 
time, there were significant increases in farm yields and the ploughing up of previously 




A temporary measure 
Rationing was considered a temporary measure for the duration of the war. That is, the 
system was supported partly because the public could see an end to it. This helps explain 
the widespread public dissatisfaction with rationing in the post-war period, particularly 
amongst women (who were most directly affected by rationing restrictions through being 
responsible for shopping and cooking in most households).
17 Without the threat from 
Hitler, rationing no longer seemed justifiable. This was despite the efforts of the Labour 
Party, who argued that post-war rationing was necessary to help deal with external 
economic problems (the balance of payments deficit, the dollar shortage and large 
overseas debts), to keep down inflation (which was under pressure due to their policy of 
maintaining full employment), and to ensure that the social equity established during the 
war was maintained. Increasingly voters took the Conservative Party’s view that in the 
post-war context austerity was an unnecessary limitation on individual liberty and the free 
market, which helps explain the Conservative’s electoral victory of 1951. Rationing could 
not be sustained in a context of party-political ideological conflict. 
 




Despite the fact that US soldiers were dying for their country alongside their British 
counterparts after the US entered the war in 1941, the situation on the home front was 
markedly different. While Britain was in an era of austerity, the US was experiencing a 
wartime economic boom: civilian consumption increased 22% during the war. According 
to the economist John Kenneth Galbraith, head of the government’s price control 
system at the Office of Price Administration (OPA), the sacrifices US consumers had to 
make were relatively mild: ‘Never in the long history of human combat have so many 




Nevertheless, US citizens were subject to rationing and retailers were faced with an 
extensive system of price controls throughout most of the war. It is remarkable that so 
many aspects of the price mechanism were placed under government control in a 
country with such a strong free market heritage and ideology, and that the system worked 
as effectively as it did.  
 Krznaric   9
Why were rationing and price controls introduced? The primary reason differed from the 
British case: instead of being motivated by the fear of food and other consumer-item 
shortages, the greater fear was inflation resulting from a full-employment war-production 
economy. In 1940 and 1941, writes Galbraith, fear of inflation reached ‘paranoia’ levels 
in government circles.
19 Second, there was – as in Britain – a need to shift raw materials 
to wartime production and to divert food supplies to troops abroad. Third, there was a 
desire amongst some members of the administration to consolidate the ethos of 
government intervention in the economy and Keynsian demand management that had 
been established in the New Deal period in the 1930s, and to ensure the equitable 
distribution of scarce goods.
20 
 
How did the system develop? 
 
The necessity of politics 
Unlike Britain, the US had not undertaken significant preparations for wartime rationing 
and price controls. However, once the US entered the war, the OPA (which operated 
from 1941 to 1946) played a major role in economic life and eventually had over 60,000 
paid staff and some quarter of a million volunteer staff.
21 The OPA, like Britain’s 
Ministry of Food, wished to impose a system of cheap prices and equitably distributed 
goods during the war. Yet it was more difficult for the OPA to act with undisputed 
authority, partly because the war was more distant and less directly threatening than in 
Britain. The OPA was thus forced to be more political, building coalitions with labour, 
consumer groups and other organisations in opposition to industry, and having 
continually to lobby Congress to be given new powers. 
 
Increasing powers 
The fear of inflation was strong, and in January 1942 Congress gave the OPA the 
authority to enforce rationing, rent control and price control. In April 1942 President 
Roosevelt announced the General Maximum Price Regulation (‘General Max’), which 
instructed sellers of goods to take as the ceiling the price that had been charged in March 
for the same good (or a similar item). This method of price control clearly left much to 
the discretion of the seller. Another problem was that agricultural products had been 
exempted from General Max, a situation that was reversed by the Economic Stabilization 
Act of October 1942. The system was given a major boost by Roosevelt’s ‘Hold the Line’ 
order of April 1943, which introduced standardized dollar and cents prices for a whole 
range of consumer items, allowing shoppers to check prices against an official list. By 
1944 the OPA was affecting 3 million businesses, issued regulations controlling 8 million 
prices, and stabilised rents for 14 million dwellings (affecting 45 million tenants). 
 
The OPA was also responsible for rationing foods and other items to 30 million 
shoppers through a mixture of points and ration stamps. Within 16 months after Pearl 
Harbour there were 13 major rationing programmes in operation, covering products 
such as tyres, cars, petrol, sugar, coffee, meat, processed foods, fat and cheese. By the 
end of the war rationing accounted for around one-third of the value of consumer goods 
purchased (compared to about half in Britain).
22 
 
The collapse of the system 
Whereas the post-war Labour government in Britain pushed for the continuation of 
rationing and price controls, by 1946 US Congressmen (especially those representing 
ranchers, textiles and wheat) were doing their best to deprive the OPA of its powers. The 
meat packers put their market domination into practice, cutting slaughtering by 80%, Krznaric  10
which led to the so-called ‘meat famine’ (highly problematic in a country where eating 
meat had great cultural importance).
23 Under such pressures the administration was 
forced to dismantle the OPA and reinstate the price mechanism, despite continuing 
inflationary pressures. 
 
How successful was the system? 
 
Although scholars tend to emphasise the failures, it is clear that OPA policies played a 
major role in keeping inflation down during the war. Consumer prices rose under 2% 
between 1943 and 1945, and total food costs, constituting a third of the average family 
budget, actually fell 4%.
24 The mobilisation of hundreds of thousands of volunteers to 
enforce the system (see below) demonstrated a widespread support for price controls 
amongst consumers. As Galbraith points out, however, not all the credit for keeping 
inflation down should go to rationing and price controls, as taxation and compulsory 
savings also played an important part in dampening demand.
25 
 
There were serious problems with the system and it is clear that there was more evasive 
and illegal activity in the US than Britain.
26 Amongst the difficulties with General Max 
were that retailers charged exorbitant under-the-counter prices, sold shoddy merchandise 
at regular prices or simply closed down and reopened with new higher prices to avoid the 
General Max price ceilings.
27 It is estimated that in mid-1944 as much as 40% of meat 
was being sold on the black market.
28 Selling or trading coupons by consumers was 
technically illegal but rarely prosecuted. 
 
More generally, trade association and business leaders mounted fierce opposition to the 
OPA, in stark contrast with British business’s largely accepting attitude to wartime 
economic necessities. The opposition of the meat packing lobby (a virtual cartel) has 
already been mentioned above. The OPA attempted to introduce textile rationing, but 
opposition from industry forced it to abandon the idea.
29 In 1941 the head of the OPA 
suggested limits on car production as it was draining enormous resources that were 
required for the war effort. Industry representatives, unsurprisingly, attacked the idea 
viciously.
30 Nevertheless, it was still possible to force all plants to cease production of 
passenger cars, and commuting by car was limited by petrol rationing (most people 
received three gallons per week).
31 
 
What accounts for the accomplishments? 
 
To the extent that rationing and price controls were successful, the following factors 
were of importance: 
 
Voluntary action 
Shoppers – especially women – became invigilators of the price control system. 
Hundreds of thousands of women took ‘The Home Front Pledge’, publicly swearing an 
oath to ‘Pay no more than Ceiling Prices’ and to ‘Pay your points in full’. Over 250,000 
volunteers worked with 5,525 local War Price and Rationing boards, regularly checking 
neighbourhood prices to ensure that local retailers were not cheating the system (very 
different from the British case, which did not rely on such voluntary action).
32 Here the 
OPA was drawing on a long tradition of US civic participation and a growing culture of 
consumer rights. By 1945, 7% of all women shoppers (around 2.1 million people) 
claimed to have reported a price violation. An historian of the system emphasises, ‘For 
one of the few moments in history, and certainly the only time at the government’s Krznaric  11





Like Britain, there was a mass government campaign for people to grow their own 
vegetables in what were known as ‘Victory Gardens’. By 1943, 20 million households 
(around three-fifths of the population) were producing more than 40% of the vegetables 
Americans consumed. Amongst the incentives were that Victory Gardeners were granted 
300 miles of extra petrol rations. As in Britain, ‘wartime victory gardening and canning 




The oligopolistic structure of major US industrial sectors – such as steel, aluminium, oil, 
chemicals and pharmaceutical – made it easier to impose price controls. As Galbraith 
says, ‘We were successful also because, even in those days, concentration in American 
industry had gone far beyond the current estimate or appreciation of the textbooks…It is 
far easier to deal with a handful of large firms that with a plethora of small ones.’
35 
 
What accounts for the failures? 
 
The main factors limiting the effectiveness of the system were: 
 
Lack of regimentation 
As discussed above, the British system of rationing and price controls was far more 
regimented than in the US. The OPA was never able to gain control of the supply chain 
of key goods or to restrict the range of goods available (which would have simplified 
supervision of the market). In addition, fewer resources were put into administration and 
enforcement. The OPA was much stronger at the local level, where its volunteers 
operated, than at the federal level.
36 
 
Business and political opposition 
The OPA was continuously fighting political battles against the private sector, as well as 
Congress, which resulted in its limited power and non-compliance with its regulations. 
Compared to Britain, rationing and price controls were seen much more as a political 
issue than as a matter of national interest. 
 
Freedom from fear 
The US public, in addition to politicians and business, did not feel the same fear or threat 
from the war as did people in Britain. Although Pearl Harbour had been bombed and 
hundreds of thousands of US troops were abroad, most people felt that the war was 
distant and did not necessitate drastic sacrifices. As a head of the US rationing 




Absence of the Dunkirk Spirit 
Some commentators argue that US citizens lacked the public spirit and moral fibre to 
comply with rationing and price controls. While the US may not have had an equivalent 
to the ‘Dunkirk Spirit’, the evidence suggests that this factor should not be 
overemphasised. In both countries, ‘there were early attempts to control prices that relied 
primarily on voluntary compliance, and in both countries these attempts failed’.
38 That is, Krznaric  12
something more than public spirit was required to make rationing and price controls 
work, in Britain as well as the US. Krznaric  13




‘Japan today should be an impoverished, slum-ridden, peasant society subsisting on an 
eroded moonscape, rather than a wealthy, dynamic and highly industrialized society living 
on a luxuriant, green archipelago.’
 39  
 
It seems hard to believe this apocalyptic vision of the environmental historian Conrad 
Totman. Yet for centuries Japan seemed ‘bent on accomplishing its own destruction’ 
through ravaging its woodlands, leaving bald mountainsides where there had once been 
dense forests.
40 Pre-industrial Japan was a wooden-structured civilization as dependent 
on timber as we are today on oil. In order to meet its huge appetite for timber, the old-
growth forests of the three main islands (especially in the Kinai Basin, encompassing 
Kyoto and Osaka) were largely cut down or otherwise depleted, particularly between 
1570 and 1670. Natural re-growth and scattered efforts of re-planting were unable to 
keep pace with demand. By the eighteenth century, during the Tokugawa shogunal 
regime, this destruction of the forests had led to severe resource scarcity that raised the 
prospect of economic and social collapse. 
 
How was the impending environmental catastrophe averted? How is it that today Japan 
is a ‘green archipelago’, 80% of which is covered with forested mountains, rather than a 
‘slum-ridden, peasant society’? 
 
The short answer concerns woodland management. There was the development of a 
‘negative’ regime of regulations to limit timber extraction, followed by a ‘positive’ regime 
of producing more trees which saw the introduction of plantation forestry from around 
the 1760s. This latter development made the most substantial difference, allowing the 
archipelago slowly to renew its forest coverage during the nineteenth century. In contrast 
with rationing during World War II, this was a long-term problem with a long-term 
response. Like climate change, it required policy changes of which the main beneficiaries 
would be future generations. 
 
How was Japanese society organised at the time of this threat? The Tokugawa bakufu 
(shogunate) was a military dictatorship based in Edo (today’s Tokyo), which directly 
administered one-quarter of Japan. The remainder was ruled by around 250 subordinate 
barons or daimyo, each in charge of their own government or han. The bureaucracies of 
both the bakufu and han were staffed by samurai. Of the country’s 30 million population 
in the eighteenth century, some 85% lived in rural areas, the vast majority being peasants. 
A peculiarity of the Tokugawa regime is that it enacted a policy of economic and cultural 
isolation from foreign influences and effectively became an autarky, engaging in almost 
no foreign trade that could help relieve its resource scarcity.
41 The regime was also 
marked by a long period of peace following over a century of civil war. Confucianist 
ideals, such as the stress on social order and hierarchy, were prevalent amongst 
Tokugawa elites. 
 
What caused such extensive forest depletion in the seventeenth century? First was the 
vast construction boom instigated by the elite, which required a surge in logging and the 
wholesale destruction of forests to build thousands of wooden castles, mansions, palaces, 
temples and shrines. Unlike in Europe during the same period, there was little use of 
alternative materials such as stone, bricks or mortar.
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continually requisitioning lumber for these monumental building projects, many of which 
were designed to enhance the status of major regime officials and leaders. Second, cities 
and towns were growing at a fast pace, leading to greater demand for housing 
construction timber (almost every element of a Japanese home being made from wood) 
and also for wood for fuel (firewood and charcoal). By 1800 the population of Edo, at 1 
million, was greater than that of Paris or London. General population growth 
exacerbated the demand for timber.
43 A third factor was the expansion of agricultural 
land for food production at the cost of forests. Finally, agricultural development required 
large amounts of natural fertilizer because of the intensely farmed poor soil, and much of 
this fertilizer (e.g. scrub brush and leaf fall) was sourced from woodland.
44 
 
Deforestation was not only problematic because of the potential constraints it placed on 
urban development and agricultural production (through the scarcity of fertilizer). 
Governments were dependent on timber as a source of income, selling it from their own 
lands or raising taxes from commercial logging. Villagers were dependent on woodland 
for their everyday livelihood. And forests also played a vital role in preventing erosion 
and flooding of Japan’s ecologically fragile lowlands. 
 
Before analysing how Japan resolved the problem of woodland depletion and acute 
timber scarcity, it is important to clarify who was responsible for the forests. The 
concept of ‘owning’ land did not exist in Tokugawa Japan. Rather, there was a complex 
system of overlapping use rights. By around 1700 large portions were designated ‘lord’s 
forest’ or ohayashi, which were overseen by the government and its ruling lords. In 
addition there were communal tenure forests subject primarily to local jurisdiction, which 
were used mainly by villagers for their timber and woodland needs. In practice, most 
woodland was subject to multiple use by both rulers and commoners.
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From around 1630 to 1720 a ‘negative’ regime of ad hoc woodland management 
gradually developed as a response to forest depletion and the increasing competition for 
forest resources between government, merchants and villagers. By the 1660s this had 
evolved into a nationwide attempt to limit forest usage. Awareness of timber scarcity in 
the islands was possibly spurred on by the Meiriki fire, which swept through the city of 
Edo in 1657, killing around 100,000 people and destroying thousands of mansions and 
dwellings. It is estimated that reconstructing only half the houses of commoners would 
have required logging some 2,500 hectares of prime forest.
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Policies pursued by both the bakufu and daimyo governments included: decrees closing 
forests to logging to allow for regeneration; placing limits on the amount of timber that 
could be extracted from government-controlled lands; and limiting the felling of trees 
over a certain size or of a particular species. Such regulations could apply not only in 
lord’s forests but in any areas of woodland, including a villager’s front yard. Han officials 
and their subordinates surveyed woodlands, kept records of timber usage, and 
investigated breaches of restrictions. At the local level, there were complex regulations 
introduced to limit the gathering of fuelwood and organic fertiliser on both household 
and communal land. There were also rules about the number and type of tools that could 
be used for logging and the type of pack animals for carrying the yield. 
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In addition to these supply-side controls were a series of demand-side regulations to limit 
wood consumption, which amounted to a system of rationing. Edicts were introduced 
specifying the type, size and number of pieces of wood that could be used to construct 
or repair bridges, dykes, dams, and boats. The size of new buildings was also regulated, 
and peasants were forbidden from using certain precious woods when building their 
homes. In an effort to link consumption to status, those higher up the social hierarchy 
were permitted to use scarce timbers and build larger houses. This was clearly a less equal 
system than the ‘fair shares’ rationing of World War II Britain. 
 
Although this negative regime constituted an elaborate system of administrative controls 
and legal sanctions, it was poorly enforced and had little effect on regenerating Japan’s 
increasingly scarce woodlands. Pressure to open up more agricultural land also limited 
the impact of the negative measures, as did governments’ continuing demand for lumber 
for construction and for sale in order to raise revenues (despite their rhetoric about the 
need to limit forest depletion). Government attempts to limit tree felling was also 
frequently opposed by villagers who demanded continued access to the forests, in 
accordance with their customary use rights. Overall the main role of the negative regime 





The real saviour of Japan’s forests was the development of a positive regime of 
afforestation during the eighteenth century, which has continued into the present. Like 
the negative regime, it was a slowly evolving and often localised response to a long-term 
problem that only became consolidated and relatively systematic from around 1760. 
There were three main elements to its development. 
 
First was the emergence of new forms of silviculture knowledge from the seventeenth 
century, often in the form of manuals or treatises on how to plant trees and maintain 
forests to maximise timber yields. These were written by an assortment of itinerant 
scholars, village headmen, minor officials, practicing farmers and others. New methods 
were used to ensure that propagation through seed or vegetative cuttings was more 
effective, with increased survival rates. More effort was placed on tree aftercare to make 
sure that not only did the saplings survive into maturity, but that they yielded straight and 
valuable timber. Greater knowledge of soil types and habitat developed, so tree species 
were grown in appropriate locations. New systems for thinning and trimming branches 
also emerged. All this arboreal knowledge helped foster a basic conservation ethic in pre-
industrial Japan. It was also a necessary part of the establishment of successful plantation 
forestry for it transformed it into a potentially profitable enterprise. Such new silviculture 
methods were helped by topographical and climatic conditions which facilitated rapid 
tree regrowth. 
 
Second was the widespread planting of new forests, rather than just the protection of old 
ones or reliance on natural regeneration. This was undertaken primarily by governments 
but also by village communities and entrepreneurs in the timber trade who could reap the 
yield of their investment after several decades. In the region of Hida, for example, the 
bakufu forests had been largely stripped of timber by the 1740s. From then on officials 
ordered villagers to plant new trees and by the 1850s they were being paid to set out 
around 100,000 seedlings per year. Entrepreneurial tree planting developed more slowly 
and commercial forestry did not become common until the mid-nineteenth century.
48 
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A third element in the establishment of successful plantation forestry was changes in 
landholding arrangements. As noted above, most woodland had been open to multiple 
users for centuries. The problem was that this system, which entailed continual demands 
on woodlands by both government and villagers, was not conducive to long-term forest 
growth and maximising timber yields. As disputes over scarce timber increased (e.g. 
between daimyo and villages, and between and within villages) a new system gradually 
emerged where forests were designated as having a single or primary user. One example 
was the practice of wariyama, in which lord’s forest or village common land was divided 
amongst householders in a village, helping to clarify use rights and reduce disputes. 
Rental forests became more common, often in the form of nekiyama, in which a villager 
planted a site and sold the timber in advance to a merchant. The villager nurtured the 
trees and when the trees were harvested after several decades, the villager could replant 
and re-lease the land. Under another arrangement (known as buwakebayashi), the 
government leased land to a village or peasant, who planted and nurtured the trees and 
was then permitted a share of the yield. 
 
By the mid-nineteenth century long-term forest stability had been achieved across the 
archipelago, a revolution of sorts that had involved government, villagers and 
entrepreneurs in a mosaic of practices that contributed to the development of plantation 
forestry. 
 
Why was afforestation successful? 
 
There are several underlying factors explaining the successful development of plantation 
forestry in pre-industrial Japan, which was fundamental in preventing an ecological 
catastrophe that could have brought about severe economic and social breakdown. 
Before specifying these factors, it should be noted that societies have often solved their 
problems of resource scarcity by seizing foreign territory or engaging in trade. Both of 
these options were precluded by the Tokugawa isolationist policy, forcing the 
development of home-grown solutions to timber scarcity.
49 
 
Political authority and labour control 
Much plantation forestry took place as a consequence of decrees by the Tokugawa 
shogunate and regional barons, who realised that their long-term survival and financial 
solvency depended on maintaining and developing forests. Frequently the result of such 
top-down policies was depriving villagers of their customary use rights. The authoritarian 
political system permitted new laws and regulations to be introduced without significant 
opposition, just as the effectively authoritarian government that existed in Britain during 
World War II could introduce rationing without substantive resistance. Governments 
also had the power to draft in forced (corvée) peasant labour to undertake the arduous 
task of planting. When this feudal unpaid labour was not available (particularly the case 
by the nineteenth century), governments could depend on extremely low wage rates to 
keep costs to a minimum. In several regions ‘the han governments used their authority to 




Action by local communities 
Although there were strong top-down forces behind afforestation in Japan, we should 
not forget the importance of activities by local communities (beyond their role in 
providing labour for governments and lords). It was often village communities who put 
in place new regulations and use-rights to help adjudicate between those disputing over Krznaric  17
access to scarce forest resources. Villages also planted forests on communal lands or 
limited lumbering to ensure an inheritance for all their future members, not just for their 
own families. Additionally, they planted woods to protect their lands from erosion and 




The changing economics of the timber industry 
Plantation forestry was an extremely long-term, costly and risky investment. There was 
usually around fifty years between planting and harvesting the timber, large amounts of 
labour was required for planting and aftercare, and trees could easily be lost in severe 
weather or through disease. Plantation forestry expanded when it became financially 
viable or profitable for governments, entrepreneurs and villagers to make such a 
substantial investment. A new investment climate emerged due to the scarcity of timber 
(which pushed up its price), improved silviculture knowledge and the shift from multiple 
to single-use forests. All this depended on Japanese society continuing to rely on timber 
as one of the central resources of everyday life as well as on ever-increasing demand due 
to rising urban population.
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Concern for future generations 
One of the puzzles of forest recovery in pre-industrial Japan was why anybody would be 
interested in planting trees that could only be harvested after fifty years, when those who 
had instigated the planting may well be dead. An answer lies in the great concern for the 
well-being of future family generations in traditional Japanese culture (which partly has 
Confucian roots), in addition to the principle of heredity that shaped political authority.
53 
Shoguns and barons envisaged their descendents surviving as rulers into future 
generations, and plantation forestry became a means of ensuring their patrimony. This 
held for entrepreneurs and villagers as much as for political leaders: ‘a basic assumption 
on which villagers commonly planned the future was that ideally one’s heir would inherit 
one’s estate’.
54 Such cultural attitudes created a long-term vision which encouraged them 
to invest in plantations and engage in long-term contracts that would ultimately benefit 
the family lineage rather than themselves.  
 
The love of nature 
Some analysts suggest that a specifically Japanese love of nature helps account for forest 
recovery. This connection with nature is expressed in many areas, such as raising bonsai, 
developing ornamental gardens, viewing cherry blossoms, landscape painting, flower 
arranging and the literary works of Bashô. The argument is that depleted woodlands and 
bare hillsides prompted a society that loved nature to protect and plant forests.
55 There 
are several problems with this perspective. First, it is not clear why those possessing such 
a strong love of nature would have plundered the forests in the first place. Second, many 
scholars suggest that the Japanese ‘love of nature’ is less a concern with the real 
ecosystem than it is an aesthetic abstraction which is more urban than rural, more indoor 
than outdoor, and more about luxury and delicacy than the crude, disordered and grubby 
world of planting trees on remote hillsides. The evidence suggests that those who were 




In sum, a conjunction of top-down and bottom-up policies, and producer responses to 
the changing timber marketplace, all set against a cultural background of respect for the 
well-being of future generations, helped ensure that today’s Japan is not the denuded 
lunar landscape it could so easily have become.Krznaric  18
CONCLUSION 
 
What can we learn about tackling climate change from this analysis of forestry policy in 
Japan, and rationing and price controls in Britain and the United States? 
 
There are two major problems with attempting to draw conclusions from just two 
historical case studies. 
 
First, they illustrate only a small number of the ways in which social change takes place. 
Change happens in many ways, such as legal decrees from above or social movements 
from below, through educational empowerment or the development of new 
technologies, or due to the formation of political coalitions or emergence of elite 
divisions.
57 The fact that the selected cases both used strong top-down methods to 
confront resource scarcity, for instance, does not mean that such an approach is always 
necessary or indeed desirable.  
 
A second problem concerns the specificities of historical context. Japan is no longer 
ruled by shoguns and Britain is not about to be invaded by Hitler. It would be unwise to 
draw too many specific lessons from the past for application in a very different present. 
The case studies in this paper cannot tell us how to design the details of the third phase 
of the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme, whether the Contraction and 
Convergence model promoted by the Global Commons Institute is the most effective 




Yet these case studies are still instructive. They provide an opportunity to step back and 
consider the big picture of tackling climate change as opposed to getting ensnared by the 
complexities of contemporary policy debates.  
 
The case studies reveal several lessons for successfully confronting the climate crisis. 
Unfortunately these lessons leave me with a greater sense of pessimism (if not despair) 
than of hope. 
 
REASONS FOR HOPE 
 
1.Successful, radical reform is possible 
The case studies demonstrate how governments can introduce far-reaching reforms to 
tackle resource scarcity that change patterns of consumption, production and 
distribution. We live in an era in which national governments are afraid of radical 
legislation (in fact, they rarely use the term ‘radical’). Most governments are more 
interested in gradual change, in compromising, in taking the path of least resistance. Yet 
the case studies in this paper remind us this is only one approach to politics. As we have 
seen, in two of the leading capitalist economies of the mid-twentieth century – Britain 
and the United States – the price mechanism itself was suspended for a vast array of 
consumer goods. Consumers adjusted to rationing and price controls, and became 
habituated to them (just as London’s car drivers have become accustomed to paying for 
driving in the centre of the city in recent years). Business accepted the changes as a 
necessity (though with less success in the United States). In the Japanese case, too, 
extensive reform by both the shogunate and regional barons took place, with radical 
schemes that resulted in the closing of whole forests to logging and the planting of vast 
mountainsides in one of the world’s first efforts of mass afforestation. With this Krznaric  19
historical perspective, more radical policy options such as per capita emission rights no 
longer appear so unrealistic. 
 
2.Regulation is more effective than voluntary schemes and incentives 
Japan was not able to reforest its denuded mountainsides through gentle encouragement 
of villagers and lumbermen, or through hoping that the invisible hand of the market 
would solve the problem. Similarly, when voluntary price control schemes were 
introduced in the United States, they failed dismally. And in Britain, the fact that 
rationing was mandatory for everyone, with paupers and aristocrats receiving the same 
allocation, contributed to the widespread support for the system. Although we should be 
wary of the abuse of political authority and the danger of ‘being forced to be free’, the 
case studies suggest that compulsory forms of adjustment by individuals, the private 
sector and the public sector are vital tools in tackling resource scarcity. We can learn 
from this history that, in the right circumstances, regulation works. 
 
3.Local action makes a difference  
Although the case studies reveal the importance of national government action to tackle 
resource scarcity, they also demonstrate the significance of local action in making the 
policy effective. In Japan villagers developed their own forest protection and plantation 
schemes. In the US, hundreds of thousands of women were volunteer price-checkers as 
part of a highly decentralised system of price control enforcement. In Britain, millions of 
people were digging for victory, making a fundamental difference to food production, 
nutrition and community development. One of the lessons of the history of human 
societies (and also of the history of development policy) is that major social change 
cannot be sustained without grass-roots action and support. Tackling climate change 
should not be reduced to a raft of national legislation and international agreements. Our 
reinvented world must be fuelled not only by renewable energy but by a new culture of 
local activism, cooperation and education that encourages those with high-carbon 
lifestyles to adopt a more humble way of living. The local action that is already taking 
place must be built upon.
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4.Tackling scarcity can be a way of creating equality 
One of the most significant effects of rationing and price controls in Britain and the US 
was that they resulted in more egalitarian societies, particularly with respect to 
consumption. While the wealthiest members of society were forced to cut back their 
consumption levels, the poorest citizens were given guaranteed access to scarce goods, 
rather than being excluded by exorbitant prices for products in short supply. Nutrition 
levels for those of lower income levels improved, especially amongst children. In the 
British case, there was even a strong demand for the extension of rationing once it became 
clear that the wealthy could buy their way out of scarcity. The US case illustrates that the 
equality effect will diminish if weak administrative systems and poor enforcement 
mechanisms allow the development of substantial black markets. Tackling climate change 
through policies such as Contraction and Convergence may be a unique opportunity to 
introduce greater equality both within and between countries.
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REASONS FOR PESSIMISM 
 
1.Political resolve combined with long-term vision is necessary  
One of the reasons why Japan solved its woodland depletion problems was that the 
country’s elites had a long-term vision of hereditary rule which facilitated afforestation 
schemes that would reap benefits only after decades. Today’s politicians, in contrast, are Krznaric  20
locked into electoral cycles, and a culture of immediacy and media sound bites, which 
seem to preclude the long-term vision required to confront global warming.  
 
There is also the related matter of political resolve. Japan was successful in tackling 
scarcity partly because there was a military dictatorship that permitted the shogunate and 
regional barons to issue decrees to replant forests and limit timber consumption without 
significant opposition. Similarly, Britain during World War Two had effectively an 
authoritarian government that could impose rationing more or less by decree. 
Governments were able to make major decisions and act upon them. Today, in an age of 
party competition and regular elections, it is more difficult for governments to impose 
radical legislation without the fear that it will alienate both electorates and wealthy party 
funders, and be reversed after an electoral defeat. In the current context politicians need 
considerable resolve and courage to push through radical policies to tackle climate 
change, yet this is precisely what they appear to lack. I am reminded of the British 
television comedy ‘Yes Minister’, in which a senior civil servant gives a junior colleague 
the following advice: ‘Above all, if you wish to describe a proposal in a way that 
guarantees that a Minister will reject it, describe it as courageous.’ 
 
2.Fear and propaganda are essential 
A major reason why rationing was so successful in Britain compared to the US was 
because in Britain there was a genuine fear of shortages of consumer goods and a fear 
that without major sacrifices on the home front Britain could lose the war. This was a 
key reason explaining why not only individual citizens, but also businesses, supported 
rationing schemes. In the US, by contrast, the war seemed far away and substantive 
sacrifices felt excessive to many, especially business leaders who spent much of their time 
fighting against the rules and regulations of the Office of Price Administration. In 
Britain, wartime propaganda was also more extensive and effective, helping to generate a 
public consciousness of sacrifice in the face of scarcity and the threat from Hitler. In 
Tokugawa Japan, one of the explanations of the slow initial response to the destruction 
of the forests was that it occurred gradually, over a long period of time, and there was 
limited fear of immanent shortages that would fundamentally disrupt daily life. It was 
when there were cataclysmic events such as the Meiriki fire that government woke up to 
the dangers of woodland depletion.  
 
The problem today is that, particularly in the wealthy countries of the North, there is no 
strong fear of the realities of climate change that parallels the fear of wartime invasion 
and occupation. This fear may not appear until there are repeated cataclysmic events 
equivalent to Hurricane Katrina which devastated New Orleans, or until governments 
undertake mass propaganda campaigns to generate fear of climate change, just as they 
have done in the cases of smoking and drink-driving. There is a danger that this fear 
could contribute to psychological denial and paralysis, so it important that people are also 
given a sense of hope that the climate crisis can be overcome.
61 Nevertheless, it is 
important to remember that human societies have taken action based on shared fear. 
 
3.The market must be approached with care 
The Japanese case illustrates how a new investment context (partly created by the 
revolution in silviculture knowledge) evolved that made it economical and profitable to 
engage in plantation forestry on a commercial basis. Similarly today markets are 
advocated as a central tool in tackling climate change, for instance providing the 
incentive for companies to invest in developing new renewable energy technologies, or 
through trading systems operating to allocate carbon emissions in the transport sector. Krznaric  21
But during World War II, it was absolutely clear to the British and US governments that 
the market could not allocate scarce resources effectively and equally, in a way that would 
ensure citizens received a ‘fair share’ of basic consumer goods. And in Japan, the market 
was only one part of a solution to the problem of forest depletion. In a neoliberal age it 
seems obvious to resort to the market to solve the problems of climate change but the 
wartime case signals the need for caution.  
 
4.Consumerism must be curbed, but it is difficult to sustain limits on 
consumption in the long term 
 
One of the factors that facilitated curbs on consumption in wartime Britain was that the 
culture of consumerism was not as deeply ingrained as it is today. British people in 2007 
are used to choosing amongst thousands of products when they visit a supermarket; such 
expectations did not exist in pre-war Britain. Only one in ten British households ran a 
private car at the beginning of the war while today in England three in every four 
households has at least one vehicle, with almost one in three having two or more 
vehicles.
62 When rationing began in 1940, large sectors of the population had personal 
memories of rationing during World War I; most British people today have lived their 
whole lives in an era of consumer choice and relative abundance. Weaning consumers in 
wealthy countries off their high-carbon consumption lifestyles will require significant and 
long-term cultural change. 
 
An additional factor that helped the success of wartime rationing was that people 
believed it to be temporary. There was always the promise that rationing would end once 
the war had been won. The British Labour government’s efforts to maintain rationing in 
the post-war years was extremely unpopular and, according to many scholars, was a 
major factor in their downfall in the election of 1951. The contrast with today’s context 
is clear: carbon dioxide emission levels need to be reduced for the long term. We must 
cut back on how often we fly abroad not just for a few years, but for our lifetimes. This 
is an enormous challenge that will only be alleviated through substantial increases in the 
production and use of clean renewable energy. 
 
5.It is easier to tackle a national problem than an international one 
A bias of the two case studies is that the problem of scarcity was largely contained and 
confronted within national borders. Forest usage in India was not affecting woodland 
depletion in Japan. Consumption patterns in Brazil during World War II had little impact 
on consumption and scarcity in Britain and the United States. In both case studies policy 
responses were on the national level without significant resort to international 
cooperation (although the US did supply some foodstuffs to Britain). Climate change, 
however, is an inherently cross-border problem requiring international cooperation to 
devise mitigation and adaptation solutions. The case studies can give little help in solving 
the problem of how to make this cooperation happen. 
 
 
In the face of these reasons for pessimism about the possibility of successfully tackling 
climate change, I can only conclude with the following: 
 
GET RADICAL: radical policies, at the national and international level, are the only 
option. 
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GET MOVING: massive social mobilisation from below is necessary to raise public 
awareness, change consumer culture and pressure governments. 
 
GET SCARED: if we don’t learn how to fear climate change, the planet will burn. 
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